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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY 










STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a proceeding involving a deficiency sales and 
use tax assessment imposed against plaintiff by defend-
ant for the period, October 1, 1957, to September 30, 
1961. The sum presently in dispute is $33,471.78, to-
gether with interest, of which $33,219.96 is sales tax on 
materials and services and $251.82 is use tax. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE UTAH STATE TAX 
CO~IMISSION 
Formal hearing, after a written petition had been 
filed by plaintiff, was held before defendant. From a 
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Decision and a later Amended Decision of defendant, sub-
stantially adverse to plaintiff, it commenced proceedings 
for review by this court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the entire sales tax de-
ficiency assessment sustained by defendant in its Amend-
ed Decision, or that failing, a reversal of the portion of 
said sales tax deficiency where defendant has imposed a 
sales tax upon certain services, identified under Point 
II, and, in addition, plaintiff requests an order requiring 
defendant to give favorable consideration to plaintiff's 
claim for refund or credit. 
Plaintiff also seeks a reversal of that portion of the 
use tax deficiency assessment sustained by defendant 
in its Amended Decision which relates to the consump-
tion of coal by plaintiff in the direct operation of rail-
road revenue equipment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a Utah corporation having its principal 
place of business at Ogden, Weber County, Utah. (R. 
205) It owns, maintains and operates a railroad termi-
nal facility at Ogden for the joint and equal benefit of 
Union Pacific Railroad Company and Southern Pacific 
Company, each of which owns 50 per cent of plaintiff's 
capital stock, except for qualifying shares of individuals. 
Both Union Pacific and Southern Pacific (as they will 
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hereinafter be identified) are railroad corporations oper-
ating in both passenger and freight service in interstate 
commerce, and both operate lines of railroad into plain-
tiff's terminal at Ogden, Utah, and use said terminal fa-
cilities as their principal passenger and freight terminals. 
(H. 206) 
For many years plaintiff has operated the terminal 
fncilities pursuant to an agreement with its parent com-
panies, commonly known as the Ogden Yard Agree-
ment of 1920. This agreement outlines the basic and 
overall design of the operation of the terminal by plain-
tiff as well as the duties and responsibilities of plaintiff 
as directed by its parent companies. (R. 22, 204-229) 
One of the principal responsibilities of plaintiff in 
the operation of said terminal, pursuant to said agree-
ment, is to perform all inspections and running or light 
repair services on behalf of Union Pacific and Southern 
Pacific at Ogden for all cars, both foreign and domestic, 
passenger and freight, arriving at or leaving plaintiff's 
terminal facilities in Union Pacific and Southern Pacific 
trains, and to provide whatever materials are necessary 
to make said light repairs. (R. 207) 
In addition, plaintiff operates the passenger and 
freight stations and furnishes all necessary labor for 
switching cars. It also supplies the labor and material 
to its parent companies for the following· services: (1) 
cleaning of passenger cars, diners and cabooses, which 
consists of washing and wiping walls and equipment, 
mopping floors, vacuuming rugs and removal of refuse 
and garbage therefrom; (2) washing the exteriors of 
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windows in diesel cabs ; ( 3) inspecting and checking the 
heating, lighting and cooling systems in passenger cars 
and in maintaining the battery charges therein by tempo-
rarily connecting the same to a power source; ( 4) lubri-
cating cars in transportation service, which consists of 
inspecting and maintaining the waste and oil levels in 
journal boxes; ( 5) icing and watering passenger cars 
and cabooses; (6) stenciling baggage trucks and benches; 
( 7) loading, coopering and reclaiming (removing) port-
able grain doors from freight cars; (8) cleaning, bedding, 
sanding and disinfecting livestock cars; (9) cleaning 
train markers, lamps and lights; (10) adjusting ladings 
in cars; and (11) stripping or disconnecting cables and 
removing batteries from diners. Plaintiff also cleans, 
maintains and repairs the terminal and all facilities con-
nected therewith, including its own equipment. (R. 207-
208, 211, 214-229) 
All of the foregoing services and any other ac-
tivities performed by plaintiff are directed primarily 
to the efficient operation of the railroad business of its 
parent companies at Ogden and elsewhere, and to assist 
Union Pacific and Southern Pacific in carrying out the 
responsibility imposed on them by federal law (Interstate 
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C., Chapter 1, Sees. 10, 11, 13 an<l 
21) to inspect, repair and maintain all railroad cars, both 
domestic and foreign, for the purpose of maintaining 
safety, to keep traffic moving and to provide an adequate 
supply of cars in interstate commerce. (R. 206-207) 
The entire net expense of operating and maintaining 
the terminal companies, as set forth in the Ogden Yard 
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Agreement, both for services as well as materials, is 
apportioned to Union Pacific and Southern Pacific by 
plaintiff at cost on an agreed formula basis without mone-
tary profit of any kind to plaintiff. (R. 27, 207-8) In 
fnrt, said agreement prohibits plaintiff from making a 
monetary profit. (R. 29) 
In the operation of the terminal facilities, plaintiff 
lenses certain limited areas to independent third parties. 
In this respect there is a snack bar in the depot passenger 
building open to the public and plaintiff receives a 
percentage of the gross receipts from the operation 
thereof. It leases space to the United States for a 
railroad mail terminal and it also receives minor 
sums for locker rentals, telephones for cabs, and for 
storage, demurrage and switching. The total average 
of all sums paid to plaintiff from the foregoing sources, 
or otherwise, is less than 3 per cent of the cost of oper-
ating the terminal facilities, and pursuant to the Ogden 
Yard Agreement must be used exclusively to reduce ex-
penses charged to Union Pacific and Southern Pacific for 
the operation and maintenance of the terminal. (R. 30, 
31, 36-38, 224-225) 
Plaintiff acts primarily and almost exclusively for 
the joint and equal benefit of Union Pacific and South-
ern Pacific, at their specific instance and instruction, and 
for no other persons or corporations. It neither solicits 
nor undertakes to perform services for other railroad 
companies or for the general public in the normal com-
mercial trade and does no advertising of the type of 
business in which it is engaged. No third parties seek out 
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and request its services. Its business nature is neither 
generally known to non-railroad interests nor, with the 
exception of its parent companies, to railroad interests 
as well. (R. 32, 41, 42, 208) 
During the period of the audit, plaintiff had a sales 
tax license issued pursuant to Section 59-15-3, U.C.A., 
1953, and collected and forwarded to defendant taxes 
on materials used as services and repairs on behalf of 
Union Pacific and Southern Pacific, as well as for sand 
and straw used for bedding and for hay used in feed-
ing livestock sold to Union Pacific and Southern Pacific. 
(R. 33, 34, 213) However, plaintiff has filed a claim 
for a credit or refund of the entire amount of said taxes 
on the ground said taxes were erroneously paid and col-
lected because plaintiff alleges it is not a retailer with-
in the scope and application of the Sales Tax Act. 
(R. 33) Defendant denied said claim for refund or credit 
in its Amended Decision. (R. 258) 
Although plaintiff disputes the authority of defend-
ant to assess a sales tax on any of the services performed 
for Union Pacific and Southern Pacific on the theory 
plaintiff is not a retailer within the scope of the Sales 
Tax Act, it does agree with defendant that some of the 
services performed at Ogden constitute repairs, renoYa-
tions or installations within the customary and ordinary 
meanings of those terms. As to others, however, there 
is complete · disagreement. In this regard plaintiff's 
mandatory accounting system provides some assistance 
in establishing a line of demarcation. The system fol-
lowed is the one prescribed by the Interstate Commerce 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
Commission, in accordance with Sect ion 20 of the Inter-
state Commerce Act, in the "Uniform System of Ar-
<·ounts for Railroad Companies." (Ex. 6, R. 230) Under 
said system all of the charges made by plaintiff to its 
parent companies for services in repairing cars must 
be charged to Accounts 314 and 317, which are entitled 
"Freight Train Cars; Repairs," and "Passenger Train 
Cars; Repairs," respectively. There is no dispute as 
to the nature of these services. On the other hand, vir-
tually all other services performed by plaintiff, as here-
tofore identified, must be charged to Account 402, an op-
erating account entitled ''Train Supply and Expense,'' 
and includes all miscellaneous expenses of transportation 
train service, such as cleaning, heating, lighting, lubrica-
tion, icing and watering cars. 
Defendant claims that the following services 
cha.rged to Account 402 are subject to the sales tax: 
1. Cleaning passenger cars, diners and cabooses -
Defendant claims that such services constitute a renova-
tion of tangible personal property. (R. 257) 
2. Testing and checking the heating, lighting and 
cooling systems in passenger cars and in maintaining the 
charge in the battery systems in said cars (R. 209) -
Defendant claims that such services constitute a. repair 
to tangible personal property. (R. 258) 
3. Lubricating cars in transportation train service 
-Defendant claims that such services constitute a repair 
to tangible personal property. (The oil level is reduced 
through sustained car use.) (R. 258) 
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4. Stenciling identification on baggage trucks and 
benches- Defendant claims that such services constitute 
an installation. (R. 258) 
5. Reclaiming or removing portable grain doors 
from cars after a shipment has been completed - (Re-
claiming is the opposite of coopering which involves the 
placing of inner doors into freight cars prior to grain 
shipments). (R. 211) Defendant claims that such serv-
ices constitute an installation. (R. 258) 
6. Cleaning and washing the exterior windows on 
cabs of diesel units -Defendant claims that such serv-
ices constitute a renovation of tangible personal prop-
erty. (R. 257) 
7. Cleaning and washing train markers, lamps and 
lights - Defendant claims that such services constitute 
a renovation of tangible personal property. 
8. Cleaning, sanding and disinfecting livestock cars 
-Defendant claims that such services constitute a reno-
vation of tangible personal property. (R. 258) 
It is plaintiff's contention that the foregoing services 
carried in Account 402 are not subject to the sales tax 
because they are not taxable services within the proper 
scope and application of the Service Tax Amendment. 
Defendant has also sustained a use tax on the con-
sumption of coal purchased by plaintiff in Wyoming and 
used in the production of heat at Ogden for the direct 
operation of Union Pacific and Southern Pacific r-evenue 
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t•quipmcnt. In the past, defendant has never assessed a 
sales or use tax against plaintiff for electricity purchased 
and used by it for the same purpose. (R. 212) 
On November 7, 1945, defendant issued a formal De-
cision in which it ruled that there was no sales tax im-
posed by law upon purchases of coal in Utah used in 
the generation of steam for the propulsion of railroad 
locomotives for movement of freight and passenger 
equipment, thus recognizing that such use was non-com-
mercial within the scope and application of the sales tax 
laws. (R. 251-253) There is nothing in the record indi-
cating the Decision has ever been modified or annulled. 
On November 14, 1963, plaintiff paid defendant the 
full amount of the sales and use taxes, interest and other 
charges, sustained, audited and stated in defendant's 
Amended Decision in the total sum of $40,371.13. In its 
receipt for said payment, defendant ordered that in the 
cYent proceedings are taken for review of said Amended 
Decision, and said Decision, or any part thereof, is ulti-
mately sustained, it shall then compute, assess and take 
whatever legal steps are necessary to collect additional 
interest from and after November 14, 1963, to the ulti-
mate date of payment upon any principal amount so 
sustained. (R. 260) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A RETAILER DOING 
A REGULARLY ORGANIZED RETAIL 
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J.U 
BUSINESS, KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC A~ 
SUCH, WITHIN THE SCOPE AND MEAN-
ING OF THE UTAH SALES TAX ACT. 
Under modern day sales tax concepts, if a tax on a 
transaction does not offend some constitutional principle, 
a legislature may include such transaction within the 
statutory definition of a sale and impose the liability for 
the tax upon the seller or consumer. And, with such 
broad leeway, such a transaction may be a sale for tax 
purposes and not a sale for other purposes. The mean-
ing of words or phrases in sales· tax statutes must there-
fore be considered within their proper context to deter-
mine what are and what are not taxable transactions. 
Thus, there are transactions which are not in the form of 
a sale but which, nevertheless, fall within the taxing 
statute. On the other hand, there are transactions which 
may qualify as sales, but which are not taxable because 
they do not qualify under the definition of a taxable retail 
sale or service under the applicable sales tax laws. 
It is our purpose to demonstrate in the present case 
that the entire sales tax deficiency assessed by the de-
fendant against plaintiff should be set aside because the 
transactions between plaintiff and its parent companies 
involving both transfers of materials as well as services, 
fall into the latter category. It is our contention that 
the special type of business activity and the unique cir-
cumstances under which plaintiff operates, as set forth in 
the statement of facts, removes it from the scope and 
application of the "Emergency Revenue Act of 1933," 
as amended, hereinafter called the Sales Tax Act. 
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11 
The terms ''retailer'' and ''retail sale'' are defined 
in Section 59-15-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amend-
ed, in subsection (e) as follows: 
''The term 1 retailer' means a person doing a 
regularly organized retail business in tangible 
personal property, known to the public as such 
and selling to the user or consumer and not for 
resale, and includes commission merchants and all 
persons regularly engaged in the business of sell-
ing to users or consumers within the state of Utah; 
but the term 1 retailer' does not include farmers, 
gardeners, stockmen, poultrymen or other growers 
or agricultural producers, except those who are 
regularly engaged in the business of buying or sell-
ing for a profit. The term 'retail sale' means 
every sale within the state of Utah by a retailer or 
wholesaler to a user or consumer, except such 
sales as are defined as wholesale sales or other-
wise exempted by the terms of this act; • «< «<."(Em-
phasis Added) 
Under Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, in subsection (a), a tax is imposed upon 
"every retail sale of tangible personal property made 
within the State of Utah." Subsection (e) of that sec-
tion, which was added by amendment in 1959 (Chapter 
113, Laws of Utah, 1959) imposes a service tax on "the 
amount paid or charged for all services for repairs or 
renovations of tangible personal property, or for in-
stallation of tangible personal property rendered in con-
nection with other tangible personal property.'' Since 
the Service Tax Amendment has been included in and 
made a part of the Sales Tax Act, it properly follows 
that the tax on services is subject to any and all limita-
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tions imposed on the authority of defendant to impose a 
tax on retail sales of tangible personal property as set 
forth in the Act, and that the definition of "retailer," 
above quoted, is applicable to each type of transaction. 
Such a position is consistent with the general rule of con-
struction of statutory amendments set forth in 82 C. J. S., 
Statutes, Section 384: 
''Amendments are to be construed together 
with the original act to which they relate as con-
stituting one law, and also with other statutes on 
the same subject, as part of a coherent system of 
legislation.'' 
Thus, if plaintiff is not a retailer under the Sales Tax 
Act definition, it is outside the scope of both the salrs tax 
on tangible personal property and the sales tax on serv-
ices as well. It also means that the basic limitations gov-
erning the application of the sales tax on sales of tangi-
ble personal property should be the same as those applied 
to the application of the sales tax on services. 
The Utah Sales Tax Act does not set forth a defini-
tion of the phrase "a regularly organized retail busi-
ness'' or the phrase ''known to the public as such,'' and 
no Utah case, to our knowledge, has specifically con-
strued that language with respect to the scope of the 
application of the Sales Tax Act. It appears that the 
nearest the point has been reached was in Pacific Inter-
mountain Express Co. v. State Taa; Commission, 8 Utah 
(2d) 144, 329 P. (2d) 650 (1958), containing an infer-
ence in favor of the type of limitation advocated by 
plaintiff in this case with respect to the scope of the Sales 
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'fax Act. In that case PIE had acquired all assets, in-
cluding trucks, trailers and semi-trailers, of several con-
cerns that directly or indirectly had been operating 
highway transportation rolling stock, and claimed that 
no sales tax was due on the transfer of said equipment 
because it was not a "licensed retailer" of motor vehicles. 
In considering the point, the court states: 
''As to the contention that the sales tax act is 
applicable only to sales made by licensed retailers, 
we disagree, notwithstanding the able argument 
of counsel pointing out that the taxing section 
(59-15-4) is concerned with retail sales, that the 
definition section (59-15-2) says a retail sale is 
made by a retailer doing a regular organized retail 
business known to the public to be such. Before 
1949 the contention that the act applied only to 
retail sales by a licensed dealer would have been 
conceded, but since the 1949 amendments such 
concession could not be made. We believe the plain 
wording of the amendments clearly displays a leg-
islative intent to tax all motor vehicle sales not 
exempted, irrespective of the vendor's personality 
or status, and did not mean to tax only sales of 
motor Yehicles by licensed retailers, the legisla-
tion announcing that no sale of a motor vehicle 
should be deemed occasional ( i. e., made by a non-
retailer and hence not taxable), and that on all 
sales of motor vehicles the tax shall be paid by the 
purchaser (not a licensed dealer). * * * '' 
It seems clear that the sole reason for ruling against 
PIE on this point was the 1949 amendment, which was 
added to the definition section (59-15-2) of the Sales Tax 
Act and provided ''that no sale of a motor vehicle shall 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be deemed isolated or occasional for the purposes of this 
act." That amendment, of course, is limited to motor 
vehicle transfers and is not involved in any way in the 
present case. Therefore, without the injection of that 
amendment into the court's consideration of the limi-
tation of the scope of the Sales Tax Act as advocated 
by PIE, the concession that the language in Section 
59-15-2 would have excluded PIE'S acquisition from 
the sales tax, is indicative of the court's recognition of a 
definite limitation on the scope and application of the 
Sales Tax Act. In this regard the court suggests that 
there are certain limitations in the scope of the Sales 
Tax Act based upon the "personality or status" of the 
vendor. The court also alludes to the fact that in pur-
chasing the equipment involved, PIE, whose business is 
that of a motor carrier transporting goods in interstate 
commerce, was not in a ''retailer'' status in acquiring the 
rolling stock involved from concerns in the same busi-
ness and also was not ''known to the public to be such.'' 
Other states have considered the scope and applica-
tion of their respective sales and use tax acts. In most 
instances where the matter has been in issue the legisla-
ture has provided a specific definition of the term "busi-
ness'' as applied to the transactions involved, and the 
decisions have been based upon the special legislative 
mandate. In those cases "business" has been custom-
arily defined as any activity engaged in by a person 
with the hope of gain, profit or advantage, either direct 
or indirect. Where such a definition is present, the courts 
have uniformly held that the term is not used in the nor-
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mal rommercial sense and no profit on the sale is rC'-
quired to be subject to the tax. For example, see Market 
Street Ry. Co. v. California. State Board of Equali.za-
tion, 137 Cal. App. (2d) 87, 290 P. (2d) 20 (1955); Trico 
Electric Cooperatirc v. State Tax Commission, 79 Ariz. 
~93, 288 P. (2) 782 (1955); Bonrnar-Vawter, Inc. Y. Joh'lz-
son, 157 Me. 380,173 A. {2d) 141 (1961); and Sumner Rhu-
barb Growers' Association v. State, 55 Wash. (2d) 781, 
350 P. (2d) 478 (1960). 
Utah has no such specialized definition of "business" 
in the Sales Tax Act. However, it is a part of the Utah 
Use Tax Act, (Section 59-16-2(h) ). 
Of course, under Point I, all of the taxes in question 
are sales taxes and not use taxes. Therefore, the scope 
of the application of the Use Tax Act and the definitions 
set forth therein are neither material nor helpful. Neither 
are the decisions of other states having similar special-
ized definitions of business. The proper limitation on the 
application of the Utah sales tax laws is to be found in 
the Sales Tax Act itself. The issue is basically: What ven-
dors of sales and service did the legislature intend to in-
clude within the scope and application of the Utah Sales 
Tax Act? The answer lies in the proper construction of 
the language in Section 59-15-2 where the title to that 
section includes the word ''scope.'' In construing that 
language, certain legal guide lines must be followed. The 
language must be considered according to its context and 
generally approved and normal usage, unless there is 
evidence of a contrary legislative intent through a stat-
utory definition specifically prescribed. There is no spe-
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cial statutory definition involved here. Therefore, the 
words used in the statute should be given their popular 
and ordinary meaning and interpretation. However, 
since the statute is a tax law, it must be strictly construed 
against the defendant, and if the right to tax is not 
plainly conferred by the statute, it is not to be extended 
by implication. Ingersoll Millin.g Machin.e Co. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue, 405 Til. 367, 90 NE (2d) 747 (1950); 
PIE v. State Tax Commission, supra; and National Dairy 
Products Corporation v. Carpenter, 326 SW (2d) 87 (Mo., 
1959). The Utah State Tax Commission is not entitled 
by an attempted all-inclusive interpretation of taxing 
statutes, or by administrative fiat, to extend the same 
beyond their legislative limits. Ruby Chevrolet, Inc. v. 
Department of Revewue, 6 Ill. (2d) 147, 126 NE (2d) 
617 (1955). 
Based upon the factual circumstances present here 
and what we believe to be the proper scope of the Sales 
Tax Act, plaintiff is not a ''retailer'' and clearly falls 
outside its application for at least four reasons: 
FIRST: Plaintiff repairs and makes installations 
in behalf of its parent companies and performs all serv-
ices at cost and no profit whatsoever is involved. In the 
normal commercial sense a "business" contemplates 
buying and/or selling for a profit. Valier Coal Co. v. De-
pa.rtment of Revenue, 11 Ill. (2d) 402; 143 NE (2d) 35 
(1957); J(opp v. Baird, 79 Idaho 152, 313 P. (2d) 319, 
323 (1957); WSAZ, Inc. v. Lyons, 254 F. (2d) 242 
( CCA-6, 1958) ; Cherat v. U. 8. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 
264 F. (2d) 767, 769, (CCA-10, 1959); and Weatherford 
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v . • lrfer, 1:~:; W.Va. 391, 63 SE (2d) 57~, 574 (1951). Hav-
ing no reason or basis to apply a special meaning to the 
term ''business,'' it should follow the generally accepted 
and customary meaning, restricting the same to activi-
ties engaged in solely for profit. Since plaintiff earns no 
profit and, in fact, is not permitted to do so under the 
Ogden Yard Agreement, it does not qualify as a retailer 
doing a. regularly organized retail business in the pres-
ent case. 
The necessity for a profit element, under the Utah 
Sales Tax Act, is also bolstered by the specific language 
in the definition of a retailer which expressly excludes 
from such status those persons engaged in agricultural or 
livestock pursuits unless they are ''regularly engaged in 
the business of buying or selling for a profit." The ne-
cessity of the element of profit in those situations, should, 
by following a construction in favor of the taxpayer, 
extend to all retail businesses in the state. 
SECOND: To qualify as a retailer, the vendor 
must be engaged in a "regularly organized" retail busi-
ness. An examination of the organization of plaintiff 
as set forth in the Statement of Facts reveals a most ir-
regular and unique type of business organization, hardly 
the type which one would consider in relation to the 
definition of a "regularly organized" retail business sub-
ject to the Utah Sales Tax laws. 
THIRD : Plaintiff performs its entire services for 
its parent companies and neither solicits nor undertakes 
to perform such services for any third party or for the 
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general public in the normal commercial trade. It does 
no advertising and makes no solicitation of any kind. 
Its business is neither generally known to nonrailroad 
interests nor, with the exception of its parent companies, 
to railroad interests. It is therefore not "known to the 
public'' as being engaged in the retail business of serv-
icing railroad equipment, or in fact, any retail sales or 
service business at all. It is of note that the phrase 
''known to the public as such'' was deleted from Sec-
tion 59-15-2( e) by the 1963 Legislature (Chapter 140, 
Laws of Utah, 1963). 
FOURTH: To engage in a "business" in the cus-
tomary sense means to voluntarily select that occupation 
or endeavor and to have control over the type and manner 
in which the activities or work of the business are to be 
carried out and to fix the charges for the work done or 
the material sold. Those elements are not present in 
plaintiff's business. It is entirely subservient to its par-
ent companies, and may operate solely under their direc-
tion and control. They require plaintiff, pursuant to 
agreement, to assist them in complying with federal laws 
and regulations relating to car service, and to perform 
all services without any profit. 
A case in point is Valier Coal Co. v. Department of 
Revenue, 11 Ill. (2d) 402, 143 NE (2d) 35 (1957), where 
the court held that Valier was not subject to the Illinois 
Retailers Occupation Tax upon its sales of coal to its 
parent corporation because it was not engaged in the 
business of selling tangible personal property at retail as 
contemplated by the Illinois Retailers Occupation Act. 
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Valier, pursuant to an order of the Illinois Public 
Utilities Commission, was not only required to sell coal 
to its parent at actual cost, but also was prohibited from 
selling coal to the general commercial trade. However, 
Valier was required to sell small amounts of coal to its 
employees, on which it paid a tax. It supplied its parent 
with coal at a price determined by the actual cost of 
production without taking into consideration any ele-
ment of profit. Moreover, it deducted all income from 
other sources from the cost of operation, in computing 
net eost, and therefore did not recover the full cost of 
operation from its parent company. 
The court held that these requirements were tanta-
mount to prohibiting the coal company from engaging in 
business since the right to sell to the general trade and to 
make a profit or realize a gain are ordinarily incidents of 
being engaged in retail business, even though the impo-
sition of the tax did not, and could not, depend upon 
whether a profit was actually realized. 
There is no difference whatever to Valier's situation 
and plaintiff's in the present case. Here, plaintiff's par-
ent companies are required by federal law to furnish a 
safe, suitable and adequate car service. Said parent 
companies, owning virtually all of the stock in plain-
tiff, can and do require plaintiff to assist in fulfilling that 
federal obligation. Plaintiff is obligated, pursuant to 
the Ogden Yard Agreement to perform those services. 
There is no element of profit involved. Since those serv-
iees are compulsory and rigidly controlled, they cannot 
qualify plaintiff as being engaged in a voluntary retail 
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business as contemplated by the Utah Sales Tax Act. 
Therefore whether rigidly limited and forbidden to make 
a profit by a state administrative ruling, as was the tax-
payer in the Valier case, or whether required by agree-
ment to assist its parent corporations to satisfy manda-
tory and compelling requirements of federal law on a cost 
basis, as is plaintiff in this case, the principal elements 
of a voluntary and "regularly organized retail business" 
involving retail sales are completely absent. 
Since plaintiff does not qualify as a ''retailer'' under 
the Utah Sales Tax Act, and therefore makes no retail 
sales, then it consistently follows that any sales taxes 
heretofore paid on materials should now be refunded or 
credited pursuant to plaintiff's application therefor. 
POINT II 
THE SERVICE TAX AMENDMENT DID 
NOT INTEND TO IMPOSE A SALES TAX 
ON ALL SERVICES, BUT ONLY THOSE 
SERVICES WHICH CONSTITUTE AC-
TUAL REPAIRS OR RENOVATIONS TO 
TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY, OR 
THE INSTALLATION OF TANGIBLE PER-
SONAL PROPERTY RENDERED IN CON-
NECTION WITH OTHER TANGIBLE 
PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
A number of the services performed by plaintiff for 
its parent companies at Ogden are not charged to its 
regular and customary repair accounts. Defendant claims 
that many of said services are subject to the sales tax, 
and plaintiff claims they are outside the scope· of the sales 
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tn..x. Tlw list of items in dispute is set out in the state-
ment of facts. 
This ( 1ourt has never construed the language in the 
SPrvirc Tax Amendment, and we have found no sales 
tax ease from another jurisdiction dispositive of the 
matter ... \s a consequence we again have a problem of 
statutory construction with no case in point and with no 
special definition of terms provided by the legislature . 
. \erording-ly, the language involved should be given its 
ordinary popular meaning and interpretation. However, 
the amendment must be strictly construed, in favor of 
the taxpayer, and its language not extended or enlarged 
beyond clear implication. In other words, the defendant 
is not entitled to expand the interpretation of the amend-
ment to an all-inclusive service tax but must give due 
consideration to each word in the statutory language and 
respect all limitations which said words, in their normal 
meaning, reasonably impose on the taxing authority. 
It is apparent that the legislature did not intend an 
all inclusive service tax when reference is made to the 
title to said amendment, in Chapter 113, Laws of Utah, 
1!139, which provides as follows: 
''An .... ~ct Amending Section 59-15-4, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, Relating to the Rate of Taxation 
Under the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933; and 
Providing a Tax on Certain Services." (Emphasis 
Added) 
The Service Tax Amendment, 59-15-4 (e), provides 
as follows: 
''A tax equivalent to 2lj2% of the amount paid 
or charged for all ser-v.;.ices for repairs or renova-
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tions of tangible personal property, or for instal-
lation of tangible personal property rendered in 
connection with other tangible personal property.'' 
It seems clear from an examination of the wording 
of the Service Tax Amendment that the legislature did 
not intend to impose a tax on all services relating to tan-
gible personal property. If that had been the legisla-
ture's purpose, it would have been a simple matter to 
have said so in concise terms. The addition of language 
confining the tax to certain types of service transactions, 
indicates a clear intention on the part of the legislature 
to limit the scope of the application of the amendment 
to those transactions, and to no others. Therefore, be-
fore a service is properly taxable it must constitute either 
a "repair," a "renovation" or an "installation." The 
critical problem of construction is, first, to review each of 
those terms on the basis of their popular and ordinary 
meanings, and, second, to consider said terms in the con-
text of the Service Tax Amendment. 
As to repairs : 
Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Edi-
tion, the edition in standard use when the Service Tax 
Amendment was enacted in 1959, defines repair as fol-
lows : ''To restore to a good or sound state after decay, 
injury, dilapidation or partial destruction.'' Cases con-
struing the meaning of ''repair'' or ''repairs,'' consis-
tently quote and adopt this definition. See Vol. 36 A, 
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, page 7 44, et 
seq., especially pages 772 to 776. 
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Aecording to numerous cases analyzed in 76 C.J.S., 
page 1169: 
''REP AIR. The word is plain, unambiguous and 
not technical, and is to be taken as used in its or-
dinary sense, and should not be given a technical 
or strained interpretation. While it has been said 
that the term is incapable of exact definition, and 
there are some varying shades of difference in the 
general definitions, the courts have generally 
adopted the commonly accepted meaning of the 
word as defined by the lexicographers. It is often 
used in the plural. 
''The word 'repair' involves the idea of some-
thing preexisting, and presupposes something in 
existence to be repaired or the existence of the 
thing to be repaired. The term contemplates an 
existing structure or thing which has become im-
perfect by reason of the action of the elements or 
otherwise; that is, something the condition of 
which has been affected by decay, waste, injury or 
partial destruction. 
''The word 'repair' relates to the preserva-
tion of property in its original condition, and com-
monly embraces rebuilding and restoration, and, 
in addition, renovation or renewal by any process 
of making good, strengthening, supplying, or 
mending; and it implies the doing of work again, 
or redoing some work found defective, or which 
has become defective from use and is in need of 
doing over again. The term does not carry the 
connotation that a new thing should be made, and 
in no sense does it mean to create a distinct entity, 
but ordinarily it contemplates only a restoration 
to the originally existing condition, as near as may 
be. Thus, under authority to repai'r there can be 
no enlargement and improvement except in so far 
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as the work of repairing necessarily enlarges and 
improves; but in practical conduct a repair very 
often results in a betterment or improvement as 
compared with the original condition.'' 
A typical statement considering the meaning of re-
pair is found in Mozingo v. Wells burg Electric Light, 
Heat & Power Compan.y, 101 W. Va. 79, 131 SE 717 
(1926), as follows: 
"What is meant by 'repair'? The numerous 
texts and courts whose decisions we have exam-
ined have adopted the commonly accepted mean-
ing of the verb 'repair' as defined by the lexicog-
raphers. Webster says: 'To restore to a sound or 
good state after decay, injury, dilapidation, or 
partial destruction.' The Standard and Century 
dictionaries define the term in the same language, 
except that the words 'mend' and 'renovate' are 
added as synonyms. (Citing authority.) 'Repair 
means to restore to its former condition, not to 
alter either the form or the material.' (Citing 
authority.) And it is generally held that repair 
does not mean to alter or change condition, or re-
place with new or different material.'' 
From the foregoing consideration, it seems clear 
that to constitute a "repair" to tangible personal prop-
erty, in the normal and popular meaning of the term, 
there must be a restoration of existing tangible personal 
property to its original state, following decay, injury, 
dilapidation or partial destruction. It contemplates 
neither a change in form nor a change in material and 
does not encompass improvements, additions or altera-
tions. By its nature the basic purpose of repair is to 
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return tangible personal property to a functional state of 
operation. Since the lubrication of cars by plaintiff is a 
service directed solely to continuing and maintaining, 
not returning, the functional state of journal boxes, and 
is not concerned with a restoration thereof following de-
cay, injury, dilapidation or partial destruction, such lub-
rication services do not constitute repairs within the 
scope of the Service Tax Amendment. 
As to renovations : 
Webster's defines renovate as follows: ''To renew, 
make over, or repair; to restore to freshness, purity, a 
sound state, newness of appearance, etc., as, to renovate 
draperies, or a house ... " 
The definition in 76 C.J.S., page 1166, is similar: ''To 
make as good as new; restore after deterioration ; put in 
good condition; renew; refresh; reinvigorate; to make 
thoroughly clean; purify. It has been held synonymous 
with repair.'' 
In Bryant v. Board of Examiners, 130 Mont. 512, 305 
P. (2d) 340 (1956), the court defines renovate as mean-
ing "to renew, make over or repair." 
In lVilliam A. Doe Co. v. City of Boston, 262 Mass. 
458, 160 NE 262, (1928), the City of Boston leased a 
portion of a building to the plaintiff for a term of ten 
years and reserved the right to make "renovations, re-
pairs and changes'' in and about the leased premises. 
The city arranged for the substitution of a concrete for 
a wooden floor in the building, for deepening the cellar, 
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for placing girders to support the concrete floor, for 
putting in a new drainage system, for new plumbing and 
new electric wiring, and for other structural changes in 
the premises. Plaintiff claimed an unlawful eviction. 
However, the court held for the lessor, by construing the 
language ''repairs, renovations and changes'' in part as 
follows: 
"It is to be observed that the right which the 
lessor reserved was not limited to the making of 
repairs, but authorized the city to make 'renova-
tions . . . and changes' in and about the leased 
premises. The word 'renovations,' as applied to 
a building, means the making new after decay, de-
struction or impairment; the renewing materially; 
the restoring by replacing worn-out, unsafe or 
damaged parts; the creatin,g anew. To make 
'changes' means to make different, to alter to put 
one thing in place of another ... " (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
In Finney v. Bennett, 97 N.Y.S. 291, 292, the court 
held that where plaintiff knew that magnesium stains are 
a frequent, inherent and ineradicable defect in bricks, 
and defendant did not know that fact, and plaintiff con-
tracted to ''renovate the entire brickwork on a house, 
guaranteeing to make it look like new,'' without making 
any exception of magnesium stains, he could not urge the 
impossibility of eradicating magnesium stains which ap-
peared on the house, and which he was unable to remove, 
as an excuse for not complying with the terms of his 
contract by removing all the stains. 
To illustrate the difference between ''renovation'' 
of bricks, as required in the Finney case, and "cleaning" 
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of ln·irks, 14 C.J.S., page 1197, defining "clean'' as a 
verb, provides : ''In a particular context, the word has 
heE.ln held to imply an undertaking to do no more than 
clean the superficial areas as distinguished from an un-
dertaking to remove stains in stonework several inches 
in depth.'' (Emphasis supplied.) 
Another example of the scope of "renovate" is 
found in U. S. v. Nine Barrels of Butter, 241 F. 499, 500. 
(S.D. NY, 1917). In that case the court held that melting 
down of butter to a fluid, so that all solid matters fall to 
the bottom, and then straining and blowing it into a 
spray, in which condition hot water is allowed to per-
colate through the oil, after which the water is drawn 
off and an emulsion made with milk, cooled into crystals 
and packed, constituted the renovation of butter. The 
same type of renovation is involved where used motor and 
diesel oil is re-converted or renovated into reusable oil 
through a chemical process . 
. A case illustrating a practical limitation on the 
meaning of "renovate," is Harvey Y. Switzerland Gen-
eral Insurance Co., 260 SW (2d) 342 (:Mo. App., 1953). 
That case involved an action to recover under an insur-
ance policy for a loss sustained when the insureds em-
ployed a third person to spray their carpet with a liquid 
,solution to prevent moth infestation, and the solution 
stained and discolored the carpet, causing damage. The 
policy inYolved, insured plaintiff's personal property 
from all risks, except damage to the property occasioned 
either by moth infestation or by any work thereon in the 
course of a ''refinish, renovating or repairing process.'' 
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The defendant relied upon the exclusionary provisiOn. 
The court, however, held for plaintiff, on the ground the 
spraying was a preventive measure against moth infesta-
tion, not actual moth infestation, and that it did not con-
stitute work in the course of ''refurnishing, renovating 
or repairing." 
In determining the plain and unambiguous meaning 
of ''renovating,'' the court states: 
"To 'renovate' according to Webster's Inter-
national Dictionary, Second Edition, among other 
things, means 'To renew, make over or repair; 
restore to freshness, purity, a sound state, new-
ness, of appearance, etc .... ' Renovation or res-
toraUon involves a return from an abnormal or 
da.maged stale to a normal, sound state. It does 
not contemplate a preventive measure whereby an 
effort is made to insure the continuation of a nor-
mal, sound sta.te." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The foregoing analysis illustrates the scope and ap-
plication of the term "renovation" and supplies us with 
a clear conception of the popular and ordinary meaning 
thereof. The authorities conclude that a renovation to 
property is similar in many respects to a repair, as indi-
cated by Webster and the Bryant case, supra. However, 
it is also readily apparent that those terms in their ordi-
nary application, are not identical. In practical opera-
tion they overlap in many areas, but there are some 
unique characteristics in each, especially with respect to 
renovations. 
The cases and authorities indicate that the basic pur-
pose of a renovation, with the exception of the restora-
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tion of certain products to a pure state, such as rancid 
butter, illustrated by the Nine Barrels of Butter case, 
supra, and used oil products, is to cause an improvement 
in the overall appearance of the article. In many, if not 
a majority of instances, there is also an improvement in 
the function or utility of the article, but this is not the 
prime moti,·c for a renovation; and, in fact, such im-
provement in functions need not be involved at all. A 
basic illustration of renovation, where no functional ele-
ment is necessarily involved, would be periodic painting, 
which is concerned with bringing the article involved back 
to a newness of appearance following damage or pro-
longed exposure to the elements. However, to qualify 
as a renovation, in that illustration, and in all other cases 
heretofore considered, it is clear that there must be a 
major or substantial restoration of the article to a new-
ness of appearance and not simply a superficial clean-
ing. The distinction is found in the authorities cited 
earlier with respect to cleaning and renovating brick and 
stonework; cleaning was limited to a superficial washing, 
and renovation included the removal of deep stains from 
the brick. 
It is also clear that before a renovation of an article 
can occur, the article must be in an abnormal, unsound or 
damaged state as a condition precedent. This point is 
brought out in the Harvey case, supra, where the court 
held that renovation, "does not contemplate a pre-
YentiYe measure whereby an effort is made to insure the 
continuation of a normal, sound state." It contemplates 
··a retun1 from an abnormal or damaged state to a nor-
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mal, sound state." By clear implication, every day clean-
ing services as performed by plaintiff for its parent com-
panies cannot qualify as renovations. Such services are 
directed primarily to the continua~ion in appearance of 
property in a normal and undamaged condition and also 
constitute, in many instances, preventive measures to 
continue a normal, sound state. 
In addition to the fact that cleaning services are not 
within the normal concept of a ''renovation,'' based upon 
an independent consideration of the term, there is also a 
clear expression of legislative intention to that effect in 
the present case. In the same bill ( SB No. 175) contain-
ing the enactment of service tax on repairs and renova-
tions, the legislature included a provision imposing a 
service tax on "the amoun,t paid or charged for laundry 
and dry cleaning services." (59-15-4(g) ). If the legis-
lature had intended to include cleaning services within 
the concept of "renovation," as defendant contends, why 
did the lawmakers feel that it was necessary to add a pro-
vision to the bill specifically covering certain cleaning 
services~ The answer, and the only one which gives 
reasonable and practical effect to both provisions of the 
enactment, is that the legislature did not intend to include 
cleaning services within ''renovations.'' Otherwise, the 
laundry and dry cleaning provision would be superfluous, 
a result which would violate the basic rule of statutory 
construction, that the legislature is never presumed to do 
a useless act, and all language in legislative enactments 
must be given practical effect, if that can be done on a rea-
sonable basis. In applying the proper construction of 
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excluding cleaning services from ''renovations,'' it also 
follows that the only cleaning services which are taxable 
are those specifically covered in 59-15-4(g). 
There is an additional area in which the term ''reno-
Yation'' may have some application. This area is illus-
trated by the Doe case, supra, extending renovations to 
include major repairs and renewals, and perhaps into the 
area of additions and betterments as well. However, 
there appears to be no practical need to inquire into 
whether or not a ''renovation'' includes such services in 
this case, since there is a third category of taxable serv-
ices under the Service Tax Amendment involving instal-
lation of tangible personal property on other tangible 
personal property, clearly taking cognizance of that 
situation. 
As to installation: 
'Vebster defines installation as follows: ''Setting 
up or placing in position for service or use.'' Install is 
"to set up or fix, as a lighting system, for use or service." 
The cases where the term has been considered follow the 
\Vehster definition rather closely. See State v. Jones, 
~42 XC 563, 89 SE (2d) 129, 131, (1955); Smith v. Kap-
pas, 218 XC 758, 12 SE (2d) 693, 697 (1941); and King 
, .. Elliott, 197 XC 43, 147 SE 701, 704 (1929). 
Install is defined in 44 C.J .S., page 408, as follows : 
"In builder's terminology, to set in place, to 
connect up, and fix ready for use; and specifically 
applied to machinery, the word has a technical 
meaning, which is to set up or :fL""{ in position for 
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use or service; to place machinery in that posi-
tion where it will reasonably accomplish the pur-
poses for which it is set up; to set up or fix for use 
or service, as to install a lighting system.'' 
In DeM erritt v. Forbes Milling Co., 114 Kan. 62, 216 
P. 1086 (1923), the court held that where a contract for 
the sale of a cleaning attachment to a steam boiler al-
lowed the buyer sixty days after it was installed in which 
to make a trial or its effectiveness, installation was com-
plete when the cleaning attachment was affixed to the 
boiler. (Emphasis supplied.) See also Carver v. Denrn, 
117 Utah 180, 214 P. (2d) 118, 121 (1950). 
From our examination of the cases and authorities, 
considering the term "installation," it appears that the 
popular concept of the term, in its customary and ordi-
inary meaning, includes the following elements : 
( 1) A physical attachment of personal property in 
a manner similar to annexation of an article of personal 
property to real property, thereby converting the same 
into a fixture. This usually involves some mechanical fit-
ting so that under ordinary circumstances the article be-
comes a part of the structure itself, and is used as a part 
of the article to which it is appropriated; and (2) when 
the personal property is in place, there must be some rea-
sonable degree of permanency in the attachment as well 
as the usage thereof. Of course, in the present case, 
taxable installations are limited by the statutory lan-
guage to attachments to tangible personal property. 
In the practical application of the Service Tax 
Amendment, many acts of installation will also qualify 
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as a repair or a renovation. However, in a case where 
personal property is restored beyond its original state 
and therefore not a repair, or is improved beyond the 
ud of restoration to a new appearance and therefore not 
a renovation, or where there is no repair or renovation 
involv~d at all, through the process of additions to or 
improvements upon tangible personal property, in the 
nature of a betterment, such services can only be taxable 
under the Service Tax Amendment on the theory of an 
"installation." 
The foregoing consideration of the three terms in 
the Service Tax Amendment, demonstrating the cus-
tomary and ordinary concepts they convey to the aver-
age person, is also indicative of their proper context in 
the amendment. All three have similarities, but they are 
not identical. Each includes within its scope and ordi-
nary conceptual limits, some areas of application not 
found in the other two. In applying those recognized con-
ceptual limits to the three words in the amendment, each 
is given an independent scope and effect outside the area 
where it overlaps with the others, and as a result, the 
legislative purposes indicated by wording the statute in 
the disjunctive, is properly and reasonably satisfied. 
On the other hand, the right of the taxpayer to have the 
statutory language strictly construed is served, because 
the language is not extended beyond clear implication to 
au all-inclusive service tax. 
There is no question that many services performed 
by plaintiff at Ogden constitute repairs, renovations or 
installations. In this regard it is readily conceded that 
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all services charged to plaintiff's regular repair accounts 
314 and 317 properly qualify as repairs, renovations or 
installations. However, those services are not being con-
tested under this Point. Only services outlined in the 
Statement of Facts and carried in account 402 are in-
volved. We submit that each of the services outlined is 
clearly outside the service tax under the foregoing 
analysis of the scope and application thereof, and, accord-
ingly, all of the sales taxes based on said services should. 
be ·annulled and cancelled. 
One final comment seems necessary. Defendant has 
prescribed Sales Tax Regulation No. 78 to implement 
the Service Tax Amendment. An examination of that 
Regulation illustrates that the defendant considers the 
tax on services to be virtually all-inclusive where tan-
gible personal property is involved. Illustrative of this 
attitude is the amendment to the regulation in 1963 
which included under the service tax all "persons en-
gaged in the business of ... removing ... tangible per-
sonal property . . . '' (Emphasis added.) This would 
appear to be the exact opposite of an installation and a 
clear violation of the defendant's authority. Of course, 
the liability for a tax on services cannot be first imposed 
by regulation of defendant. It does not have the power 
to create taxable transactions not covered by legislative 
edict. Therefore, to the extent said regulation attempts 
to extend the service tax beyond the legislative purpose, 
as heretofore considered, it is invalid. 
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POINT III 
( 
10AL PURCI-IAHED BY PLAINTIFF IN 
'VYOMING AND CONSUMED IN UTAH TO 
PROVIDE HEAT FOR THE DIRECT OPER-
.\TION OF RAILROAD REVENUE EQUIP-
~~ ENT IS NEITHER DOMESTIC NOR 
CO:\L\IERCIAL USE WITHIN THE SALES 
TAX .AC'r AND IS THEREFORE EXE~IPT 
~,RO:\l BOTH 'rHE SALES .AND THE USE 
T.\X. 
During part of the period of the audit in this case, 
plaintiff purchased coal in Wyoming and used a portion 
thereof at Ogden for the production of heat for direct 
operation of Union Pacific and Southern Pacific revenue 
equipment. Defendant has assessed a tax upon that 
consumption under the Use Tax Act. 
It is plaintiff's view that such use of coal is exempt 
under a proper construction of Section 59-15-4, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, of the Sales Tax Act, which provides, 
in part, as follows : 
"From and after the effectil;e elate of this act 
there is levied and there shall be collected and 
paid: 
'• (a) a tax upon every retail sale of tangible 
personal property ... provided, however, that 
the sale of coal, fuel oil and other fuels shall not 
be subject to the tax except as hereinafter pro-
vided. 
''(b) a tax equivalent to 2 11~ per cent of the 
amount paid: 
"(2) to any person as defined in the art, in-
cluding municipal corporations for gas, electricity, 
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heat, coal, fuel oil or other fuels sold or furnished 
for domestic or commercial consumption ... '' 
Although the assessment in this instance is based 
upon the use tax rather than the sales tax, this court held 
in Union. Portla.nd Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
110 Utah 152, 176 P. (2d) 879 (1947), and in Geneva 
Steel Co. v. Sta.te Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P. 
(2d) 208 (1949), that legislative created exemptions from 
the sales tax are also to be treated as exemptions from 
the use tax. Therefore, the sales tax exemption for coal 
furnished for purposes other than ''domestic or commer-
cial,' ' is also applicable to coal purchased in Wyoming 
and used in Utah for purposes other than "domestic or 
commercial.'' 
The issue under this Point is to determine whether 
or not the phrase ''domestic or commercial consump-
tion,'' as set out in the Sales Tax Act, properly includes 
within the legislative mandate the consumption of coal 
for the production of heat for direct operation of railroad 
revenue equipment. We submit that under the applicable 
rules of construction, hereinafter considered, such use 
and consumption is clearly exempt from the sales tax, 
and in this instance, the use tax as well. 
Of course, in this case the rule of construction to 
which all others are subordinate is to give effect to the 
legislative intent as expressed in the statute, by using 
all legal aids available. This requires that the phrase 
''domestic and commercial'' be assigned the meaning that 
the ·words commonly convey, and when that meaning is 
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doubtful, the true intent must then be determined from 
the context and the purpose of the statute. Norville v. 
State Ta.r Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. (2d) 937 
(1940); 82 C.J.S., Statutes, Sections 321 and 322. The 
task is somewhat simplified because it is unnecessary to 
define the activities which lie outside the field of com-
mercial consumption. It is only necessary to inquire 
whether the use of the coal in the present case is a com-
mercial consumption. If it is not, then no tax is due. And, 
this is true whether the use is industrial or some other 
noncommercial use which would not fall within the usual 
definition of industrial consumption. 
We would agree that standing alone the phrase 
· • commercial consumption,'' (the rna terial portion of 
the language in this case) leads to sharp differences of 
opinion as to its meaning. The term ''commercial'' may 
have a broad or a narrow scope. In a broad sense it en-
compasses all business or everything pertaining to com-
merce, and in a narrow sense it includes only those enter-
prises engaged in buying and selling goods or services. 
ru.ited States v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 143 F. 
(2d) 79 (CCA-10, 1944) and State ex rel. Kansas City 
Power & Light Co. v. Smith, 342 Mo. 75, 111 SW (2d) 513 
(1938). Therefore, a reference to the context of the stat-
ute is necessary to find the true legislative intent in this 
case. It is clear from an examination of the provisions 
of the statute above set forth that the legislature did not 
intend the broad application of the term ''commercial'' 
or to embrace the whole field of business activity. Other-
wise, the term would haYe been mere surplusage and a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
useless legislative act. It is also clear that it intended 
certain exemptions from its application. This is appar-
ent from a reading of the Title to the Act including coal 
within the exemption, (Chapter 93, Laws of Utah, 1943) 
which provides in part : 
''An Act ... Relating to the Imposition of a 
Tax Upon Certain Sales and Services, and Pro-
viding Certain Exemptions Therefrom.'' 
The intention to place a narrow construction on the 
term ''commercial'' was also recognized by this court in 
Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
supra, where it is pointed out at page 881 of the Pacific 
2nd Reporter, that the amendment establishing the pres-
ent language in Section 59-15-4(a) (b) (2), which be-
came effective March 18, 1943, '' ... in effect, exempted 
sales of industrial coal from the sales tax ... From our 
interpretation of the effect of the exemption from the 
sales tax it follows that industrial coal has been exempted 
from both the sales and use taxes since March 18, 1943.'' 
The court also recognized in that case that the uses 
to which coal can be put are not limited to the three 
categories of domestic, commercial and industrial con-
sumption, by expressly indicating that for the purpose of 
that opinion that it used the "term 'industrial coal' and 
'coal for industrial use' as meaning 'coal other than sold 
or furnished for domestic or commercial consumption.' '' 
In accord, is the court's prior opinion in that case, 
Union PortlOA~d Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
110 Utah 135, 170 P. (2d) 164 (1946). 
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A helpful and well reasoned case on the point in-
volved here is State v. Smith, supra. There an unsuccess-
ful effort was made to impose a sales tax on electric 
current used in propelling street cars where the statute 
taxed all sales of electricity to ''domestic, commercial and 
industrial consumers.'' The state clai.J:ped that electricity 
used in the propulsion of street cars was a ''commercial'' 
use. The court, however, pointed out that using "com-
mercial'' in the broad sense would include all business 
activity, including industrial pursuits, and thus the term 
"industrial" in the statute would have been a useless 
act by the legislature. It therefore ruled that the ordi-
nary and restricted sense of commercial and industrial 
applied and that transportation of passengers failed to 
qualify under either term. 
A case involving the identical language set forth in 
the Utah statute is Wis. Power Co. v. United States, 336 
U. S. 176, 93 L. Ed. 591, 69 S. Ct. 492 (1949). At the 
time that case was decided the United States imposed a 
tax on electrical energy for ''domestic or commercial 
ronsumption'' under Section 3411 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1939, as amended. (The section was re-
pealed October 20, 1951.) It was originally enacted in 
1932, one year before the same language appeared in the 
Emergency Revenue Act of 1933. The federal regula-
tion, defining the scope of the section, provided in part : 
''The term 'electrical energy sold for domestic 
or commercial consumption' does not include (1) 
electrical energy sold for industrial consumption, 
e. g., for use in manufacturing ... or (2) that sold 
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for other uses which likewise can not be classed as 
domestic or commercial such as ... railroads ... '' 
Our research has not disclosed a case where under 
a statute such as ours a court has held the term ''com-
mercial consumption'' to embrace the use of coal or 
other energy used in the direct operation of railroad rev-
enue equipment. We submit that under the proper 
limited construction of our statute, as above considered, 
it would violate the legislative intent to do so. 
We do not understand that defendant now contends 
for an all-inclusive application of "domestic or commer-
cial consumption.'' But it does seek in this case, to broad-
en the scope of "commercial" to include the use of coal 
as set forth herein, which it ruled to be exempt under 
formal decision, contemporaneously with the 1943 
amendment, and which it has consistently exempted in 
actual administrative practice for at least twenty years. 
Under such circumstances, as an extrinsic aid to the de-
termination of the legislative intent, the doctrine of con-
temporaneous construction would appear to be applic-
able. The doctrine provides that a constant administra-
tive construction of a statute by those charged with the 
duty of applying the same for a long period of time, 
raises a presumption that such a construction correctly 
interprets the statute and, although not binding on the 
court, is entitled to great weight. State v. Hatch, 9 Utah 
(2d) 288, 342 P. (2d) 1103 (1959); Alexander v. Bennett, 
5 Utah (2d) 163, 298 P. (2d) 823 (1956); and Utah Pmrer 
& Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 107 Utah 155, 
152 P. (2d) 542, 557 (1944). 
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POINT IV 
FOLLO\VING PAYMENT BY PLAINTIFF 
(H, THE TAXES AND INTEREST STATED 
lN DEFENDANT'S AlVIENDED DECISION, 
PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 59-15-16 AND 
;>!1-16-13, U.C.A., 1953, DEFENDANT HAS NO 
RIGHT TO COLLECT FURTHER INTER-
Esrr <)N SAID TAXES IN THE EVENT 
~.\ lD A:MENDED DECISION, OR ANY PART 
THEREOF, IS AFFIRMED. 
This Point is based upon an ''executory'' order of 
dd'endant (R. 260) and therefore the question may be 
premature at this time. However, to remove any possi-
bility of waiver, plaintiff has assigned the defendant's 
ruling in this respect as error on this appeal. In doing 
~o plaintiff specifically hereby disclaims any concession 
or eYen implication of a lack of confidence in the validity 
and soundness of its arguments in prior Points. 
By paying all taxes and interest assessed by defend-
ant, which Commission has no limitation imposed by law 
upon its use of the money so paid, plaintiff cut off de-
fendant's authority to exact additional interest. 
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CONCLUSION 
Initially, we submit that plaintiff's unusual status 
and business operation rem~ves it from the scope and 
application of the Sales Tax Act, not only with respect 
to sales of tangible personal property to its parent com-
panies, but also with respect to sales of seiTices for 
repairs, renovations, or installations in connection with 
tangible personal property. Therefore, the entire sales 
tax deficiency sustained by defendant should be reversed, 
and defendant should be directed to give favorable con-
sideration to plaintiff's claim for refund or credit of all 
sales taxes paid on materials sold to its parent companies 
during the period involved. 
Our second argument, entirely unrelated to the first, 
and of consequence in this case only if. plaintiff is unsuc-
cessful in convincing the court it is not subject to the 
Sales Tax Act, or to that portion involving the service 
tax, is an effort to place what we believe to be a reason-
able limitation on the scope of the sales tax on services. 
We have attempted to confine the sales tax to those serv-
ices which constitute repairs, renovations or installations 
within the ordinary and customary meanings of those 
terms. We think that the services in dispute in the pres-
ent case should not be subjected to the sales tax and that 
defendant's efforts to do so constitute an unwarranted 
attempt to extend its authority beyond the scope of the 
legislative intent. 
Finally, we urge that the court order defendant to 
recognize the exemption from tax of the consumption of 
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roal by plaintiff in the manner herein set forth, not only 
to meet the legislative requirement with respect to "do-
mestic or commercial consumption,'' but also to be 
ronsistent with its own formal ruling of long standing 
and prior administrative practice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH 
A. U. MINER 
HOWARD F. CORAY 
SCOTT M. :NIATHESON 
GARY L. THEURER, 
404 Union Pacific Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorn.eys for Plaintiff 
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